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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal comes before the Court pursuant to the Idaho Supreme Court's Amended 
Order Granting Motion for Permission to Appeal, in which the Court, pursuant to I.A.R. 12( c), 
grants the Appellants permission to appeal from the District Court's Memorandum Decision and 
Order denying the Appellants' Motion to Dismiss the Respondent's Petition for Judicial Review. 
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. On May 11, 2011, the Respondent, Gordon Ravenscroft (hereinafter "Ravenscroft") filed 
a Petition for Judicial Review asking the District Court to review the decision of the 
Board of County Commissioners for Boise County to terminate Ravenscroft's 
employment. (R. 3). 
2. On May 27,2011, the Appellants filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that the District 
Court lacked jurisdiction to hear Ravenscroft's Petition. (R. 14). 
3. On September 14, 2011, the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order 
denying the Appellants' Motion to Dismiss. (R. 39). In its decision, the District Court 
noted that, "the Idaho Supreme Court has clarified that is has 'given an expansive reading 
to I.C. § 31-1506, notwithstanding the fact that the provision is included in a chapter that 
addresses county finances.'" (R. 41). 
4. Thereafter, Appellants sought, and were granted permission to appeal the District Court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order pursuant to I.A.R. 12(c) (R. 79). 
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C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Ravenscroft is a former full-time employee of Boise County, Idaho. (R. 4). 
2. While serving as a full-time employee, he was served by Boise County with a Notice of 
Proposed Personnel Action dated February 28, 2011. (R. 4) The Notice was served on 
Ravenscroft before any administrative investigation had been done. (R. 4) 
3. Subsequent to being served with the Notice, an administrative investigation was 
conducted by a deputy prosecutor for Boise County, Cherese D. McLain. (R. 4). 
4. Ravenscroft hired legal counsel, asserted his rights pursuant to Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 
U.S. 493 (1967), and cooperated fully with the investigation conducted by Deputy 
Prosecutor McLain. (R. 5). 
5. At issue during the investigation was a payment arrangement approved by the prior Board 
of Commissioners which compensated Ravenscroft using a combination of county-paid 
time and contract labor payments in order to save Boise County money. (R.6). 
6. A hearing was held on April 12, 2011. (R. 5). Just prior to the hearing, and without 
giving Ravenscroft enough notice or time to prepare, Deputy Prosecutor McLain 
disclosed documents she intended to introduce at the hearing against Ravenscroft 
depriving him of due process rights. (R. 6). 
7. At the hearing, Ravenscroft presented testimony from a former Boise County 
Commissioner and former payroll clerk who testified in favor of Ravenscroft's position. 
(R. 6). Specifically, the former Boise County Commissioner testified that the payment 
arrangement for Ravenscroft was approved by the prior Board of County Commissioners. 
(R. 6). Deputy Prosecutor McLain, who acted both as the investigator and the attorney to 
the Board during the hearing, did not present any sworn testimony. (R. 7). 
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8. Ravenscroft had no prior employment disciplinary history. (R.7). The former Boise 
County Commissioner who testified at the hearing stated that he believed Ravenscroft 
was the best employee Boise County had ever had. (R. 7). 
9. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Boise County Commissioners deliberated for over 
two (2) hours. (R. 7). Ultimately, Boise County decided to terminate Ravenscroft's 
employment. (R. 8). 
10. At the conclusion of the hearing process, Boise County acknowledged that it would pay 
Ravenscroft back wages which were due to him for his work at Boise County. (R. 10). 
Boise County never honored its agreement to pay Ravenscroft's back wages. (R.I0). 
11. Boise County's decision to terminate Ravenscroft was not supported by the evidence 
presented at the hearing (R. 8-9), and so Ravenscroft filed his Petition for Judicial 
Review asking the District Court to review the actions of the Boise County 
Commissioners in terminating his employment. 
II. ISSUE ON APPEAL 
1. Does section 31-1506(1), Idaho Code, grant the District Court authority to review the 
decision by a board of county commissioners to terminate a county employee? 
2. Is Ravenscroft entitled to an award of attorneys fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 
and LA.R. 41 ? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court denied the Appellants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to I.R.c.P. 
12(b)(I), a decision " ... over which this Court exercises free review." Owsley v. Idaho 
Industrial Com'n, 141 Idaho 129, 133, 106 P.3d 455,459 (2005). In cases, like this one, where 
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review is limited to a legal determination regarding jurisdiction and not contested issues of fact, 
the Court's review is limited to determining whether the District Court's analysis pursuant to the 
applicable law is correct. Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1990); see also, 
Owlsey, 141 Idaho at 133, 106 P.3d at 459. 
B. DISCUSSION 
At the heart of this appeal is the disagreement over whether I.C. § 31-1506(1) allows for 
judicial review of the personnel decisions of a board of county commissioners. The Appellants 
argue that the statute does not provide authority for judicial review because it is found in a 
section of the Idaho Code that deals with county finances and claims. However, the Appellants 
argument is not supported by the plain meaning of the statute and the prior decisions of this 
Court. 
i: Judicial review requires statutory authority. 
As a starting point, Ravenscroft recognizes that the "[a ]ctions of state agencies or officers 
or actions of a local govemment, its officers or its units are not subject to judicial review unless 
expressly authorized by statutes." LR.C.P. 84(a)(1) (Westlaw 2011). Therefore, ifthere is no 
statute which expressly authorizes judicial review of the actions taken by a board of county 
commissioners, a party may not seek judicial review. 
ii. The plain meaning ofI.C. § 31-1506 allows for judicial review of "any act, 
order or proceeding of the board" including personnel decisions. 
Section 31-1506, Idaho Code, specifically provides that: 
Unless otherwise provided by law, judicial review of any act, order 
or proceeding of the board shall be initiated by any person 
aggrieved thereby within the same time and in the same manner as 
provided in chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, for judicial review of 
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actions. 
I.e. § 31-1506(1) (Westlaw 2011). In this case, Ravenscroft is seeking review of a decision by 
the Board to terminate his County employment. That personnel decision falls within the plain 
statutory meaning of "any act, order or proceeding of the board." 
iii. This Court's previous decisions suggest that personnel decisions of boards of 
county commissioners are subject to judicial review. 
This Court has stated that it " ... has given an expansive reading to I.C. § 31-1506, 
notwithstanding the fact that the provision is included in a chapter that addresses county 
finances." Giltner Dairy, LLC v. Jerome County, 150 Idaho 559, 561, 249 P.3d 358, 360 (2011). 
Previously, the Court has addressed the application ofI.C. § 31-1506 in a personnel context. In 
what is referred to in the record as Gibson I, an Ada County Sheriff's employee, Gibson, was 
terminated for misconduct. Gibson v. Ada County Sheriff's Dept., 139 Idaho 5, 8, 72 P.3d 845 
(2003). Gibson appealed the termination decision administratively and a hearing officer affirmed 
the termination. Id. Thereafter, Gibson sought judicial review. Id. In holding that I.C. § 31-
1506 did not authorize judicial review of the termination decision, this Court stated that: 
Notably, had Gibson appealed the county personnel hearing officer 
decision to the Ada County Board of Commissioners (board), the 
board's decision would be an appropriate subject for judicial 
review and the lAP A standard of review would apply. I.e. § 31-
1506(1). 
Id. (emphasis added). 
After Gibson I, Gibson tried to appeal the hearing officer's decision to the Ada County 
Board of Commissioners. The Board refused to review the decision and Gibson again sought 
judicial review. The district court refused to grant relief and Gibson appealed arguing that the 
Board's inaction was reviewable pursuant to I.C. § 31-1506(1). Gibson v. Ada County, 142 
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Idaho 746, 133 P.3d 1211 (2006) (hereinafter "Gibson II"). This Court, in Gibson II, held that 
I.e. § 31-1506(1) did not apply to Gibson's case because Gibson was seeking a review of the 
Board's inaction (the refusal to review the hearing officer's decision) and not the Board's actions. 
Gibson, 142 Idaho at 757, 133 P.3d at 1222. The Court also held that the statute did not 
authorize the judicial review of personnel decisions of the other elected County officers, 
implying that personnel decisions of the Board are subject to judicial review. Id. 
iv. The language ofI.C. § 31-1506 is not ambiguous, so the Court should not 
engage in statutory construction. 
Unless statutory language is ambiguous, the Court " ... must give effect to the clear 
expressed intent of the legislature and is not to engage in statutory construction." Wolfe v. Farm 
Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398, 404, 913 P.2d 1168,1174 (1996). As already discussed, the 
language ofI.C. § 31-1506(1) is clear and unambiguous. It allows for judicial review of "any 
act, order of proceeding" of a board of county commissioners. The Appellants encourage the 
Court to engage in statutory construction analysis even though the statute is unambiguous, I and 
in the event the Court is inclined to accept the Appellants' invitation, each of Appellants' 
arguments will be addressed in tum . 
.Y: Allowing for judicial review of personnel decisions by the boards of county 
commissions is not absurd. 
Ravenscroft agrees that the Court should not interpret statutes in a manner that results in 
palpable absurdity. Federated Publ., Inc. v. Idaho Business Rev., Inc., 146 Idaho 207, 192 P.3d 
1031, 1034 (2008). However, there is nothing absurd about the legislature allowing for judicial 
1 Ravenscroft notes that the Appellants have argued several facts and conclusions not included in the record 
including: statements about the intent of the Idaho Association of Counties in introducing legislation in 1993. In 
addition, attaching an exhibit to the Appellants' brief is not a proper method of augmenting the record on appeal. 
See I.A.R. 30. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 6 
review of personnel decisions by the boards of county commissioners. The termination of a 
county employee requires that certain administrative procedures be followed and it makes sense 
that the legislature would provide for judicial review ofthe procedures for those individuals who 
are terminated. Despite what the Appellants contend, there has not been a rush to litigation in the 
years following Gibson I and Gibson II even though this Court suggested in those decisions that 
judicial review of personnel decisions made by the boards of county commissioners were 
allowed by statute. 
vi. Judicial review of the boards' personnel decisions does not conflict with right 
to work. 
Appellants argue that there is a conflict between allowing for judicial review and Idaho's 
"right to work" laws. In Idaho, the general rule is that an employer may terminate an employee 
at any time without incurring liability as long as the motivation for firing does not contravene 
public policy, and unless there is a contract which specifies the terms of employment. See Ray v. 
Nampa School Dist. No. 131.120 Idaho 117,120,814 P2d 17,20 (1991); Mallonee v. State, 139 
Idaho 615, 619, 84 P.3d 551,555 (2004); Van v. PortneufMedical Center, 147 Idaho 552, 561, 
212 P.3d 982, 991 (2009). The Appellant's argue that these general "right to work" rules are 
somehow in conflict with what the courts are asked to do on judicial review, to wit: determine 
whether decisions (a) violated constitutional and statutory provisions; (b) exceed the statutory 
authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported by substantial evidence in 
the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 67-5279 (Westlaw 
2011) ("IAPA"). There is no conflict as alleged by the Appellants. Rather, lAP A and I. C. § 31-
1506(1) allow an aggrieved party an avenue to seek the courts' review of employment actions 
taken by the boards of county commissioners that may be in violation of procedural or statutory 
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provisions including violations of the "right to work" legislation? 
C. ATTORNEYS FEES 
Ravenscroft requests an award of his attorneys fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 
and I.A.R. 41. 
Attorney fees and costs on appeal are appropriate under I.C. § 12-
121 ... and LA.R. 41, only if this Court is left with the abiding 
belief that the appeal was brought or pursued frivolously, 
unreasonably, and without foundation. Where an appeal turns on 
questions of law, an award of attorney fees under this section is 
proper if the law is well settled and the appellant has made no 
substantial showing that the district court misapplied the law. 
Stanley v. McDaniel, 134 Idaho 630,633, 7 P.3d 1107, 1110 (2000). 
This case has involved questions of law. Specifically, does I.C. § 31-1506(1) authorize 
judicial review of personnel decisions of the boards of county commissioners. This Court has 
spoken on this very issue twice before in Gibson I (2003) and Gibson II (2006). The legislature 
has not changed the statute at issue since the Gibson cases were decided, and the Court has 
recognized the "expansive" reading of the statute since Gibson in the Giltner Dairy decision. 
This Court has been clear in its interpretation ofLC. § 31-1506(1), and the Appellants have made 
no substantial showing that the District Court applied this well-settled law incorrectly below. An 
award of attorney's fees is appropriate in this case. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Section 31-1506(1), Idaho Code, clearly authorizes judicial review of personnel decisions 
of the boards of county commissioners. This Court has spoken on two separate occasions in the 
2 Ravenscroft notes that the Appellants did not raise the argument that a conflict exists between Idaho's "right to 
work" statutes and IAPA before the District Court. Rather, Appellants argued that allowing judicial review of 
personnel decisions conflicts with the Idaho Tort Claims Act. (R. 23). 
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Gibson decisions cited herein interpreting the statute to allow for judicial review. The Appellants 
have not made a substantial showing that the District Court misapplied the law below. 
Accordingly, the District Court's decision should be AFFIRMED and Ravenscroft should be 
awarded he attorney's fees on appeal. 
DATED this {pi> day of June, 2012. 
SUSAN LYNN MIMURA & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
B~ 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Respondent 
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